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The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces
in the face of hybrid threats
Piotr Szymański, in co-operation with Justyna Gotkowska
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have triggered a debate 
about the main directions of defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic region. In the Baltic states, 
but also in the Nordic countries and Poland, much attention is being paid to questions of Ter-
ritorial Defence Forces (TDF). TDF are viewed as one of the elements in the national defence 
systems’ response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. The Baltic states have decid-
ed to adapt their Territorial Defence Forces to new threats by making a number of chang-
es to their functioning, depending on the local conditions in each case. Given the growing 
uncertainty in the region, they have opted not to undertake any in-depth reforms of TDF 
at this stage, as that could entail a temporary disorganisation in the armed forces. In the com-
ing years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will invest in increasing the size and combat readi-
ness of their Territorial Defence Forces, providing them with better training and equipment, 
and creating a system of incentives to encourage more people to serve in volunteer formations. 
The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence 
Forces and hybrid conflict
The threat of aggression involving methods 
similar to those employed in Ukraine is part of 
the pressure that Russia has been exerting on 
the post-Soviet area. The concept of so-called 
‘hybrid conflict’ is a combination of convention-
al warfare using state-of-the-art technology 
(e.g. precision strikes against critical infrastruc-
tures, special forces operations) and indirect/
non-military actions (no declaration of war, the 
use of armed civilians, avoiding clashes with 
the opponent’s regular armed forces, informa-
tion warfare).1 Russia might use the presence of 
large Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic 
1 Jānis Bērziņš, ‘Russia’s new generation warfare in 
Ukraine: implications for Latvian defence policy’, Policy 
Paper № 02, National Defence Academy of Latvia, Centre 
for Security and Strategic Research, April 2014, http://
www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%20
02-2014.ashx
states as a pretext to interfere with their inter-
nal affairs, which increases the possibility of 
hybrid conflict in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. 
Russia could initiate such a conflict by instigat-
ing separatism, supporting protests staged by 
sections of the Russian-speaking community 
(e.g. over the status of the Russian language), 
sending groups of armed individuals wearing 
unmarked uniforms across the border, organis-
ing acts of sabotage against critical infrastruc-
tures, staging provocations with an ethnic or 
cultural background, undertaking actions aimed 
at disrupting the operation of public adminis-
tration (e.g. cyber-attacks on government serv-
ers) and conducting disinformation campaigns. 
It is increasingly likely that Territorial Defence 
Forces could serve as an element in preventing 
hybrid conflicts. The Swedish model is a classic 
example of how TDF function. In Sweden the TDF 
are part of the armed forces, and are organised 
into units corresponding to the country’s ad-
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ministrative divisions. In peacetime the compe-
tences of the Swedish TDF include participating 
in search and rescue missions, crisis response, 
border monitoring, guarding transport routes, 
protecting facilities against sabotage or at-
tack, and carrying out reconnaissance missions. 
Its tasks in wartime include locating targets and 
providing targeting information for the artillery, 
as well as defending critical infrastructures (mil-
itary bases, airfields, ammunition depots). TDF 
members are recruited from local communities, 
which means that they have very good knowl-
edge of the area which they are responsible for. 
While TDF have little chance of prevailing over 
the enemy’s regular troops or special forces, 
they are potentially able to neutralise groups 
of armed civilians, control riots, strengthen the 
security of critical infrastructures, or use their 
knowledge of the terrain to support asymmetric 
actions (guerilla warfare and sabotage), should 
the state lose control of parts of its territo-
ry. However, TDF are only part of the response 
to hybrid threats, which require a reaction 
of the entire national defence system. 
Even though the Baltic states have compara-
ble military potentials and similar geopoliti-
cal situation, their volunteer formations differ 
substantially in terms of how they are organ-
ised. Estonia has retained the Finnish defence 
model (the principle of total defence, armed 
forces based on conscription, but with a pro-
fessional component), and maintains a classic 
Territorial Defence Forces organised into units 
corresponding to the country’s administra-
tive divisions. Estonia’s Kaitseliit (Estonian De-
fence League, with around 14,800 members2) 
is a land force formation whose tasks include an-
ti-tank warfare and traditional TDF functions.3 
In Latvia and Lithuania, the shape of TDF has 
been determined by the reforms linked to the 
NATO accession, which prioritised expedition-
ary capabilities at the expense of the capacity to 
defend state’s territory. In these two countries, 
both of which have abolished conscription and 
introduced professional armed forces model 
(in 2006 in Latvia, and 2008 in Lithuania), TDF 
perform some of the tasks of reserve forces 
and traditional voluntary formations. In Latvia 
and Lithuania, the TDF are made up of land for-
mations organised into territorial units, which 
serve as a reserve base for the profession-
al armed forces: train the reservists and man 
the units in the other branches of the armed 
forces (see Attachment).4 Latvia’s Zemessardze 
(Latvian National Guard, numbering around 
8000 members) performs anti-tank and anti-air-
craft tasks, duties related to countering weapons 
of mass destruction, and conducts engineering 
works. In addition to traditional TDF tasks, it may 
take part in international operations and partic-
ipate in rapid reaction forces.5 Lithuania’s KASP 
(National Defence Volunteer Forces, around 
4500 members) perform tasks related to an-
ti-tank and urban warfare, and may also take 
part in international operations.6 Lithuania also 
2 The total number of members including the women’s 
organisation (Naiskodukaitse) and the youth organisa-
tions for girls and boys (Noored Kotkad and Kodutütred) 
is around 23,600.
3 The Estonian Defence League Act, 28 February 2013, 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/525112013006/con-
solide
4 Latvijas Republikas Zemessardzes likums, 6 May 2010, 
http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=210634&from=off; Ministry 
of National Defence (Lithuania), National Defence Vol-
unteer Forces: tasks and functions, http://kariuomene.
kam.lt/en/structure_1469/national_defence_volunteer_
forces_1357/ndvf_tasks.html
5 Ministry of Defence (Latvia), The State Defence Concept, 
20 April 2012, http://www.mod.gov.lv/~/media/AM/
Par_aizsardzibas_nozari/Plani,%20koncepcijas/2012_
va_EN.ashx
6 Ministry of National Defence (Lithuania), The Military 
Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, 22 November 
2012, http://www.kam.lt/en/defence_policy_1053/im-
portant_documents/strategical_documents.html
Even though the Baltic states have com-
parable military potentials and similar ge-
opolitical situation, their volunteer forma-
tions differ substantially in terms of how 
they are organised.
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has the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, a paramil-
itary organisation operating under the auspic-
es of the Defence Ministry; it has around 8000 
members who will be incorporated into reserve 
units in wartime. For many young people, 
involvement in the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union 
is a way to prepare themselves to join the KASP 
later on.
Debates on Territorial Defence Forces 
in the context of the conflict in Ukraine
The conflict in Ukraine has triggered discus-
sions about the reform and modernisation of 
Territorial Defence Forces in all the Baltic states. 
In Estonia, there is broad consensus that the 
country should keep its conscription system 
and not change the nature of the Kaitseliit 
as a traditional volunteer formation. Estonia 
has not amended its original Plans for the de-
velopment of national defence to 2022, which 
provide for increasing the firepower, rapid re-
sponse capabilities and training level of TDF. 
The priorities are: (1) to provide the volunteer 
formations with equipment similar to that of the 
regular forces, and further develop the Kaitseli-
it’s anti-tank potential; (2) develop infrastruc-
tures such as shooting ranges and headquarters; 
(3) increase the organisation’s size to 30,000 
members by 2022. Battalion-size units will be re-
placed by more mobile companies, to be recruit-
ed from local communities.7 After the conflict 
in Ukraine broke out, Estonia decided to sym-
bolically strengthen the Kaitseliit; in March 
2014 the Ministry of Defence allocated €1 mil-
lion to the renovation of the formation’s build-
ing in Narva, a town with a Russian-speaking 
majority. The Kaitseliit staff would also like to 
increase the proportion of the organisation’s 
members who are authorised to keep person-
7 Ministry of Defence (Estonia), Estonian Long Term Defence 
Development Plan 2009-2018, 22 January 2009, http://
www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/SKAK_2010_eng.pdf
Ministry of Defence (Estonia), National Defence Devel-
opment Plan 2013-2022, 24 January 2013, http://www.
kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13373_NA-
TIONAL_DEFENCE_DEVELOPMENT_PLAN_2013.pdf
al weapons and ammunition at home (to 75% 
in order to shorten the TDFs’ reaction time).8 
In the pre-election period, none of the major 
parties have come up with any proposals for 
thorough reforms of the volunteer formations. 
The changes that have been proposed concern, 
for instance, the creation of a coastal guard as 
part of the TDF , proposed by Prime Minister 
Taavi Rõivas’s Reform Party which won the elec-
tions on 1 March 2015.9 
In Latvia, the reform and modernisation of the 
Zemessardze is one of the Defence Ministry’s 
priorities. That is because in previous years the 
organisation has been underfinanced, and Lat-
via has plans to expand its reserve force and in-
volve the public in building up the country’s de-
fence potential to a greater extent. The debates 
on Territorial Defence Forces in Latvia mainly 
concern purchases of new arms and military 
equipment, extending the duration and scope of 
exercises, increasing the voluntary formations’ 
size and combat readiness , decentralising arms 
storage, and making service in the Zemessardze 
more attractive to citizens and employers.10 
In 2014 the Defence Ministry provisionally al-
8 ‘Home guard wants more servicemen to store weapons 
at home‘, ERR, 4 February 2015, http://news.err.ee/v/pol-
itics/a1f43a30-6bb0-4c76-9804-a1bf4f0c77ff
9 Olivier Kund, ‘National defence better off without re-
sounding election promises’ (interview with general 
Riho Terras, commander of the Armed Forces of Esto-
nia), Postimees, 9 January 2015, http://news.postimees.
ee/3050895/national-defence-better-off-without-re-
sounding-election-promises
10 Imants Vīksne, ‘Neapmācīts karavīrs ir lielākais risks’ 
(interview with General Leonīds Kalniņš, commander 
of TDF in Latvia), NRA, 9 December 2014, http://nra.
lv/ latvija/130431-leonids-kalnins-neapmacits-kara-
virs-ir-lielakais-risks.htm
In Estonia, there is broad consensus that 
the country should not change the nature 
of the Kaitseliit as a traditional volunteer 
formation. In Latvia, reform and modern-
isation of the Zemessardze are among 
the Defence Ministry’s priorities.
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located extra funding to finance the Zemes-
sardze’s exercises and ammunition.11 As a re-
sult, more members could be trained and the 
duration of exercises was extended from 8 to 
10 days per year.12 In 2015, €7.7 million has been 
allocated to the development of TDF and exten-
sion of the reserve system, which is €6.3 million 
more than in the previous year (in 2016 Latvia 
is planning to spend €6.6 million on TDF).13 
By 2018, eighteen Zemessardze units with 
higher combat readiness and increased rap-
id response capabilities are to be established 
in Latvia. The TDF rapid reaction units will be 
better equipped and trained, thanks to devoting 
at least 20 days per year to training. The struc-
tural changes are expected to entail an increase 
in the number of Zemessardze members to 
12,000 by 2020. In addition to those initia-
tives, arms and military equipment have been 
purchased from the reserves of the Norwegian 
army for €4 million (in October 2014). The TDF 
will get 800 Carl Gustav anti-tank recoilless ri-
fles, 50 Scania trucks and 50 Mercedes-Benz 
all-terrain vehicles.14 
In Lithuania, the annexation of Crimea has had 
less impact on the country’s debates about the 
future of Territorial Defence Forces in the con-
text of a possible hybrid war than it has in Lat-
via or Estonia. That is because Russian-speak-
ers account for only around 6% of Lithuania’s 
population (compared to around 27% in Lat-
via and around 25% in Estonia), which makes 
large-scale Russian-instigated protests less 
11 €780,250, including €100,000 for the youth organisa-
tion Jaunsardze. 
12 Ministry of Defence (Latvia), ‘Vējonis: Katrs apmācīts 
zemessargs un jaunsargs – neatsverams ieguldījums Lat-
vijas aizsardzībā’, 8 April 2014, http://www.mod.gov.lv/
Aktualitates/Preses_pazinojumi/2014/04/08-02.aspx
13 Ministry of Finance (Latvia), Central Government Con-
solidated Budget in Brief 2014-2016, http://www.fm.gov.
lv/files/valstsbudzets/Consolidated%20State%20Bud-
get%20in%20Brief%202014_26022014.pdf
14 ‘18 rapid response units to be created in National Guard’, 
SARGS, 30 July 2014, http://www.sargs.lv//lv/Zinas/Mili-
tary_News/2014/07/30-01.aspx#lastcomment; ‘Latvia to 
buy anti-tank weapons, armored vehicles from Norway’, 
SARGS, 12 November 2014, http://www.sargs.lv/Zinas/
Military_News/2014/11/12-02.aspx#lastcomment
likely to occur, although they cannot be ruled 
out completely. In Lithuania it is believed 
that a more likely scenario of a conflict with 
Russia would involve a conventional attack, 
e.g. an attempt at creating a land corridor 
to connect the highly militarised Kalinin-
grad oblast with the territory of Belarus.15 
Moreover, changes in the KASP will depend 
on the plans of investments in the develop-
ment of Lithuania’s land forces, with which 
its TDF are integrated (the main priority is to 
modernise the Iron Wolf motorised infan-
try brigade). Lithuania’s response to the ris-
ing uncertainty in the region has consisted 
in forming a rapid reaction force (on the basis of 
the land troops), in which TDF members serve 
alongside professional soldiers. The question of 
the functioning of TDF in Lithuania has become 
part of a broader debate about vacant posts 
in many units (so-called ‘dead souls’), im-
perfect reserve training systems and efforts 
to simplify defence command procedures.16 
In 2015 Lithuania is planning to extend the du-
ration of KASP exercises from 20 to 30 days per 
year and increase the number of soldiers called 
on to undergo reserve officers’ training. In De-
cember 2014 the Lithuanian parliament amend-
ed the statute on the use of military force. 
15 Эгле Самошкайте, ‘У Литвы есть проблема, очень 
важная для России’, DELFI, 17 February 2015, http://
ru.delf i.lt /news/ live /u- litvy-est-problema-ochen-
vazhnaya-dlya-rossii.d?id=67188786
16 Edmundas Jakilaitis, ‘What would Lithuanian army need 
in case of military aggression?’ (interview with general 
Vytautas Žukas, the commander of the Armed Forces 
of Lithuania, and the Defence Minister Juozas Olekas), 
DELFI, 28 November 2014, http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/
defence/what-would-lithuanian-army-need-in-case-of-
military-aggression.d?id=66525802
In Lithuania, the annexation of Crimea has 
had less impact on the country’s debates 
about the future of Territorial Defence 
Forces in the context of a possible hybrid 
war than it has in Latvia or Estonia.
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The changes that have been introduced au-
thorise the use of weapons by the armed 
forces (including the KASP) in four cases, in-
cluding defence of the state’s territory in the 
event of threats other than armed aggression.17 
Moreover, some politicians have proposed the 
re-introduction of military training classes in 
schools, and for self-defence guard made up 
of local community members to be created.18
Prospects for the development of Terri-
torial Defence Forces in the Baltic states
Among the Baltic states, Latvia is planning to 
introduce the most far-reaching changes to the 
functioning of its Territorial Defence Forces to 
2020–2022, while the plans for the moderni-
sation of volunteer formations in Estonia and 
Lithuania will largely be about continuation of 
current practices. None of the Baltic states are 
aiming at a comprehensive reform of their TDF 
structures because such radical changes could 
lead to disorganisation in the short term, thus 
undermining their defence capabilities. More-
over, the fact that the units in question are 
volunteer formations limits the scope for ex-
panding their combat potential, which cannot 
be built up above a certain ceiling in terms of, 
for instance, the level of training in operating 
hi-tech military equipment. The Baltic states 
17 ‘Lithuania to spend over €17 million on weaponry for Land 
Force’, DELFI, 3 July 2014, http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/de-
fence/lithuania-to-spend-over-eur-17-million-on-weap-
onry-for-land-force.d?id=65205119#ixzz3Q8Vp1Eap; 
Ministry of National Defence (Lithuania), ‘New Statute 
on Use of Military Force will allow to immediately use 
Armed Forces in response to non-conventional threats 






18 ‘Lithuanian MP suggests returning military train-




us, ‘Main challenges of hybrid war – army reserve and 




will therefore focus on attaining compatibility 
between units, increasing their level of readi-
ness, exercises with regular troops (to improve 
interoperability) and implementing legislative 
changes to create incentives to encourage 
more people to serve in TDF. In Estonia, staff-
ing and budget limitations will put brakes on 
the government’s ability to deliver on its elec-
tion promises concerning the modernisation of 
the Kaitseliit, as those postulates are not part 
of the country’s Plans for the development of 
national defence to 2022. Estonia’s defence ex-
penditures will vary around 2.05% of the GDP, 
which means that a considerable new spending 
hike is unlikely. The defence budgets of Latvia 
and Lithuania are set to be gradually increased 
to 2% of the GDP to 2020, which will probably 
offer the government more freedom to set the 
level of spending on TDF and make the plans 
for the modernisation of the Zemessardze and 
the KASP more likely to materialise. In the com-
ing years, both states will probably look for 
a systemic solution to the problem of insuffi-
cient numbers of trained reservists (as the TDF 
are in charge of training them). Moreover, the 
tasks related to the participation of the Zemes-
sardze and the KASP in international operations 
will probably be limited, and the traditional TDF 
functions expanded.
The demographic crisis will remain the main 
factor affecting the Baltic states’ ability to de-
velop their Territorial Defence Forces , as it will 
hinder their efforts to increase membership and 
expand reserves. Latvia and Lithuania are con-
sidering reinstating conscription, should they 
fail to fill the vacant posts in the armed forces 
in other ways. Latvia has announced mandatory 
None of the Baltic states are aiming 
at a comprehensive reform of their Terri-
torial Defence Forces structures because 
such radical changes could lead to disor-
ganisation.
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training for reservists this autumn (with around 
2500 soldiers), and the Lithuanian parliament 
adopted legislation reinstating conscription 
for a period of five years (19 March 2015).19 
While public interest in serving in TDF or para-
military organisations has increased noticeably 
in all the Baltic states in the wake of the Russian 
annexation of Crimea, it will be a major chal-
lenge to transform such spontaneous reaction 
into a trend.20 Investing in youth organisations 
19 ‘Rezerves karavīru mācības Latvijā varētu notikt jau 
gada beigās; iesaucamo skaitu vēl precizē, SARGS, 
2 March 2015, http://www.sargs.lv/lv/Zinas/Latvi-
ja/2015/03/02-01.aspx#lastcomment; ‘Defence Ministry 
submits draft law on conscription to Lithuanian govern-
ment‘, DELFI, 3 March 2015, http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/
defence/defence-ministry-submits-draft-law-on-con-
scription-to-lithuanian-government.d?id=67331554
20 Imants Vīksne, ‘Neapmācīts karavīrs ir lielākais risks’ 
(see footnote 10); ‘Resolve of Estonians Always High’, 
Says Head of Defence League, ERR, 26 September 2014, 
http://news.err.ee/v/society/0cf2524d-ccd9-4832-99c8-
f030e5cf418a
affiliated with the TDF , tasked with educating 
young people in the spirit of pro-state values, 
may help to consolidate the public’s commit-
ment to strengthening the defence capabilities 
of the Baltic states, without which the volun-
teer formations will not be able to function 
properly. The same applies to including the 
Russian-speaking populations in TDF activities 
on a larger scale. This is why in the coming 
years the Baltic states will face the important 
task of accelerating the process of their minor-
ities’ integration with the society and counter-
ing Russian propaganda, which represents the 
efforts to modernise TDF as a militarist policy.
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APPENDIX





2% of GDP 
(US$479 million)
0.9% of GDP 
(US$291 million)




conscription, with some ele-
ments of professionalization
number of drafted 
soldiers: 2500
number of professional 
soldiers: 3250
professional 
size of armed forces: 
5310 soldiers
professional 
size of armed forces: 
9100 soldiers
3. Branches 



















Territorial Defence Forces 
(land forces, 
8000 members including 




Territorial Defence Forces 
are part of Land Forces, 
4500 members including 


















- defence education for 
the public, promotion 
of pro-state attitudes
- organising exercises for 
members, participation 
in domestic and interna-
tional military drills,
- crisis response, rescue mis-
sions , co-operation with 
the police, border guard 
and fire brigade,
- cyber-defence
- guarding of government 
buildings, embassies and 
military facilities
- defence education for 
the public, promotion 
of pro-state attitudes
- organising exercises for 
members, participation 
in domestic and interna-
tional military drills,
- crisis response, rescue mis-
sions, co-operation with 




- training of reservists
- participation in interna-
tional operations and 
rapid response forces
- defence education for 
the public, promotion 
of pro-state attitudes
- organising exercises for 
members, participation 
in domestic and interna-
tional military drills, 
- crisis response, rescue mis-
sions, co-operation with 
the police, border guard 
and fire brigade,
- training of reservists,
- participation in interna-
tional operations
- managing the conscripts 
database, ensuring re-
cruitment of the armed 
forces, performing military 
conscription for training 
and exercises
* Imants Vīksne, ‘Neapmācīts karavīrs ir lielākais risks’ (see footnote 10); ‘Resolve of Estonians Always High’, Says Head 
of Defence League, ERR, 26 September 2014, http://news.err.ee/v/society/0cf2524d-ccd9-4832-99c8-f030e5cf418a
** Based on the information released by the Defence Ministries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the TDF in question, 
as well as The Military Balance 2014.
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- deploying units with 
wartime duties to other 
branches of the armed 
forces,
- providing host nation 
support (HNS)
- sabotage and guerrilla 
warfare
- providing military and 
technical support 
to regular forces, 
- providing host nation 
support (HNS)
- providing conscripts 
appointments in wartime,
- providing host nation 
support (HNS)
7. Arms and 
military 
equipment
IMI B-300 and Carl Gustav 
man-portable anti-tank 
system, PVPJ 1110 recoilless 
rifles, BTR-80 armoured 
personnel carriers
Bofors L/70 anti-aircraft 
autocannons , RBS 70 
man-portable air-defence 
systems, Spike anti-tank 
guided missiles, Carl Gustav 
man-portable anti-tank 
systems, PVPJ 1110 recoil-
less rifles, Škoda vz.53 field 
guns, 2B11 Sani mortars, 
Bandvagn 206 tracked artic-
ulated, all-terrain carriers
light weapons such 






- remuneration for extra 
tasks (e.g. supporting 
the border guard),
- up to 10 days of annual 
leave for drills,
- reimbursement of the 
costs of participation 
in drills (e.g. transport 
to the military unit),
- insurance as in other 
branches of armed forces
- optional remuneration for 
participating in exercises 
(5% of professional sol-
diers’ monthly pay 
per day of drills),
- €9.96 catering refund 
per day during drills 
(if the military unit 
does not provide meals),
- unpaid leave from work 
to take part in exercises 
(employers must be noti-
fied in advance of the drill 
by the commander 
of the military unit)
- remuneration for partici-
pating in exercises 
(corresponding to the pay 
of same-rank professional 
soldiers),
- reimbursement of 
the costs of participation 
in drills (e.g. transport 
to the military unit),
- catering refund during 
drills (if the military unit 
does not provide meals)
- unpaid leave from work 










n.d. Kosovo, Iraq, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan
Kosovo, Afghanistan
*** This is the duration of exercises in the first year of service in TDF. In successive years, Kaitseliit members are required 
to take no less than 2 days of exercise a year, but many of them take 8–12 days per year.
